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Abstract 
 
This paper reports the results of an explorative case study in an Italian hospital and 
presents a conceptual framework for healthcare resilience, which clarifies why and how 
healthcare structures need to be resilient in order to fully deal with clinical risk. In other 
words, it is not sufficient to take the “path to zero harm”. Healthcare companies have 
also to pursue strategies for maximizing the organizational resilience, in terms of 
resistance, reliability, redundancy and flexibility. This is quite important because, no 
matter which CRM technique and/or best practice is adopted, sometime adverse events 
occur. And, in this case, being resilient can help in dampening their negative 
consequences. By extending the focus of traditional clinical risk management to 
different kinds of risk sources (not just patient safety threats) and to different kinds of 
risk minimization strategies (not just minimize the likelihood of occurrence but also the 
risk magnitude) this paper contributes to the literatures on operations management in 
healthcare. The conceptualization of “healthcare resilience” and the in-depth case 
results allow us to offer a number of suggestions and ideas for developing further 
research in the field of healthcare operations management.  
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Introduction 
Clinical risk management (CRM) is progressively playing a more and more important 
role in the healthcare setting (Crema and Verbano, 2013b). In fact, today, patients and 
their families expect the maximum levels of quality from the healthcare system and are 
easily inclined to lunching lawsuits against hospitals, physicians and healthcare 
personnel whenever errors are made in their care process. This phenomenon has, in turn, 
stressed out the insurance system: the insurance premiums exponentially increase and, 
still worse, it happens that insurance companies sometime refuse to insure applicants. 
CRM aims at contrasting such phenomenon and improving the quality of the care 
process by “identifying circumstances which put patients at risk of harm, and then 
acting to prevent or control those risks” (Walshe, Dineen, 1998). 
As reflected by such definition, the CRM mainly focuses on events that can damage 
patient safety. Ensuring patient safety represents the main focus of CRM and, 
consequently, CRM does not consider other threatening events that can represent a risk 
source for the achievement of other hospital objectives (e.g. making the patient care 
process more efficient).  
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In the last years, a large number of techniques (mostly adapted from the industrial 
and operations management setting) such as FMEA/FMECA, RCA, etc., have been 
studied, used and re-invented, with the aim of preventing risks, so to minimize the 
likelihood of adverse events’ occurrence (Kohn et al., 2000). Furthermore, a number of 
CRM best practices (for example those proposed by the Joint Commission, the 
independent, not-for-profit organization, that accredits and certifies health care 
organizations, www.jointcommission.org) have been proposed in order to minimize the 
adverse events’ occurrence likelihood (the so called “path to zero harm”). Contrarily, 
very few studies and/or managerial practices exists related to how dampening the bad 
consequences of adverse events (the so called magnitude dimension of the risk). 
Nevertheless, no matter which powerful CRM preventive strategies are implemented 
within healthcare structures, adverse events sometime occur and hospitals and 
healthcare structures have to deal with these situations by increasing their resilience; in 
particular, Organizational Resilience (OR) is defined by the British Standards 
Institutions within the standard BS65000 (Guidance for Organizational Resilience) as 
the “ability to anticipate, prepare for, and adapt reserved respond to events - both 
sudden shocks and gradual change. That means being adaptable, competitive, agile and 
robust”. 
The purpose of this study is to explore if and how healthcare organizations do 
actually implement risk management practices other than those which are usually 
referred to as CRM practices. In other words, we wish to extend the concept of CRM 
(Extended CRM) to a more comprehensive set of systems, processes, and practices 
aimed at managing every kind of adverse event that may threaten the achievement of 
every kind of hospital objective. Furthermore, beyond the classical CRM preventive 
approach, the extended CRM embraces the adoption of resilience practices (Healthcare 
Resilience), with the goal to reduce the magnitude dimension of the risk. 
To this purpose, in this paper we try to answer to the following research questions: 
(1) Do healthcare organizations implement Healthcare Resilience practices, i.e. risk 
management practices that consider the “magnitude” dimension of risk? (2) Do 
healthcare organizations adopt Extended CRM practices, i.e. practices to contrast those 
risks that threat the achievement of their organizational objectives other than the patient 
safety? 
By virtue of the study’s explorative nature and because the existent knowledge is 
quite limited and uncertain, we used the Case Research method (Yin, 2009) to address 
our research scope; the study was conducted at an Italian hospital, the data were 
collected by semi-structured interviews, and were triangulated with documentation and 
direct observations. The findings of this study are quite interesting and tell us that 
healthcare organizations actually adopt risk management practices that go beyond the 
traditional CRM practices. Of course, given the explorative nature of the research, we 
are aware that results cannot be generalized but we believe they can constitute a strong 
motivation for the research towards the outlined direction. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Thanks to a literature review about CRM and OR, it was possible to define a conceptual 
framework, which is useful to understand the concepts to analyse in depth through the 
interviews. It includes the principal constructs emerged from the literature review, with 
reference both to CRM and OR, and is reported in figure 1. 
 
 
 
	   3	  
Traditional CRM (practices for contrasting adverse event occurrence)  
CRM is intended as process, which aims to improve the quality of the care process by 
“identifying circumstances which put patients at risk of harm, and then acting to 
prevent or control those risks” (Walshe, Dineen, 1998). We analysed the literature on 
the most used techniques and methodologies in CRM, such as FMEA/FMECA (Bonfant 
et al., 2010), HFMEA (DeRosier et al., 2002), RCA (Wu et al., 2008), but also the 
younger and more innovative techniques such as CREA (Trucco, Cavallin, 2006) and 
the Systematic Methodology for CRM developed by Gagliano et al. (2001). We also 
considered in our analysis the Joint Commission CRM best practices. From the analysis, 
we observe two particular characteristics: the first is that the goal is to preserve 
exclusively the patient safety, consequently other aspects or objectives that the 
healthcare organizations have to achieve are not covered; the second is that the 
techniques and best practices aims at reducing the risk by only focusing on reducing the 
probability of occurrence of adverse events. Metaphorically, it’s possible to imagine the 
CRM as a “barrier” that protects the objective patient safety from the threatening events 
attack by reducing their occurrence likelihood (figure 1.b). In sum, since the patient 
safety isn’t the only objective, we can observe that the other kinds of hospital objectives 
are not protected. Also, the traditional CRM barrier aims at reducing the risks by 
diminishing the likelihood of occurrence, but since it’s not possible to reduce it to zero, 
when the events happen the hospital is not prepared to contrast them. 
 
  
(a) No CRM (b) Traditional CRM 
  
(c) CRM and Healthcare Resilience  (d) Extended CRM 
Figure 1 - From the traditional to the extended CRM 
 
CRM and Healthcare Resilience (practices for reducing the risk magnitude) 
As already mentioned, healthcare providers through risk management erect a barrier that 
protect the objectives from negative events occurrence; such barrier does not help 
managing the magnitude dimension of risk. In fact, the risk is mathematically defined as 
probability X magnitude (ISO 31000 standard for risk management). The magnitude of 
the risk relates to the consequences of the risk itself. So the level of risk can be 
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expressed as the combination of its occurrence probability and its effects. As a 
consequence, in order to reduce the risk it’s possible to put into place practices aimed at 
either diminishing the occurrence probability of the adverse event or to limit the 
consequences of the occurred event. With the aim to reduce the magnitude dimension of 
risk, we consider here the resilience property: it’s defined as a measure of how quickly a 
system recovers from failures (Buckle, 2000), or the capacity of a system to experience 
shocks while retaining essentially the same function, structure, feedbacks, and therefore 
identity (Walker et al., 2006). We can observe that resilience relates to the management 
of negative events (failure, shocks and so on) when they happen, thus a more 
comprehensive risk management approach should combine practices aimed at 
increasing the resilience of the hospital with the preventive methods and techniques 
already used in healthcare. In particular, we refer to organizational resilience (OR), 
defined by the British Standards Institutions in the standard BS65000 (Guidance for 
Organizational Resilience, www.bsigroup.com) as the “ability to anticipate, prepare 
for, and adapt to events - both sudden shocks and gradual change. That means being 
adaptable, competitive, agile and robust”. Gibson and Tarrant (2010) defined four 
strategies for being resilient (see figure 2). Each strategy makes the organization able to 
manage the bad situation when it happens, so that the system performance does not 
significantly decrease  
For this reason, in our conceptual framework, healthcare resilience is represented by 
a barrier, which protects the hospital objectives in those unlucky cases when the adverse 
event was able to pass across the first barrier, namely the traditional CRM barrier, i.e. 
when it effectively happened (see figure 1.c). This further barrier reduces the magnitude 
the risk, i.e. the bad consequences of the adverse event. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Organizational Resilience Strategies (from Gibson and Tarrant, 2010) 
 
Organization Healthcare Risk Management (Extended CRM) 
There is a close link between risks, objectives and quality: UNI 11230 defines the risk 
as “the set of possibilities of an event and its consequences on the objectives”, so it’s 
possible to consider the risk as everything that may prevent the organization from the 
achievement of its objectives; in healthcare the main goal of hospitals and other public 
structure is not to make profits, but to provide quality services. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) gives a definition of quality in healthcare by introducing six 
dimensions that have to be possessed by a healthcare provider: effectiveness, efficiency, 
accessibility, patient centred, equitability and safety (Crema, Verbano, 2013a). These 
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six dimensions could represent strategic objectives, so a comprehensive risk 
management approach should consider all the risks threatening their achievement, not 
just the last on (patient safety).  
In sum, given the above argumentations, we consider in our conceptual framework 
the Organizational Healthcare Risk Management (in brief, Extended CRM) as a set of 
practices, techniques, and methodologies aimed at protecting not only the patient safety 
objective, but also the other hospital objectives by both trying to diminish the 
occurrence probability of adverse events threatening their achievement and managing 
them when occurred. In figure 1(d) the third barrier metaphorically represents this 
concept.  
 
Research Method 
Given the conceptual framework introduced in the previous section, the main goal of 
this study is to investigate if and how healthcare organizations implement Healthcare 
Resilience practices (figure 1c), i.e. risk management practices that consider the 
“magnitude” dimension of risk, and adopt Extended CRM practices (figure 1d), i.e. 
practices to contrast those risks that threat the achievement of their organizational 
objectives other than the patient safety. Given the explorative nature of this goal, in this 
paper we conduct an in-depth case study at an important Italian hospital.  
Though a single case study presents limitations in terms of statistical meaningfulness 
or generalization of results, there are different aspects that justify the choice. First, the 
healthcare is a sector with very high interaction between people, it means that it 
becomes fundamental to understand the phenomenon through the meaning the people 
give their experience more than through the extern researcher perspective, in this case 
the case research is preferable compared to other methodologies (Sherman, Webb, 
1988). Second, an explorative case research is the best choice when in order to answer 
the research questions it is necessary to explore a new knowledge area, such as in this 
case where there are no studies about extended CRM or resilience in healthcare (Yin, 
2009).  
Our case study regards an Italian hospital and we believe there are no reasons to 
think it does not represent a typical Italian hospital; in this case it’s possible to assume 
the lessons learned form this single explorative case study are informative about the 
experience of the average institution (Yin, 2009). In particular, the hospital is a typical 
Italian medium size hospital and comprises 22 wards, 198 beds, 103 physicians and 188 
nurses. The hospital has a CRM operative unit, which is dedicated to monitor and 
control, but also to facilitate the implementation, of clinical risk management practices 
in all the hospital wards.  
To develop the case research Yin’s (2009) and Voss’ et al. (2002) works were 
assumed as landmarks: to ensure the quality of work, multiple sources of evidence 
(interviews, direct observations, documents) were used to guarantee data triangulation 
and construct validity (Voss et al., 2002). Also, a data collection protocol was used and 
a database was developed to ensure the case research reliability (Yin, 2009). The case 
research was conducted for two months, seven semi-structured interviews were 
recorded and transcribed, asking questions directly linked to the concepts explained in 
the conceptual framework. The interviews lasted from 30 to 100 minutes, they were 
conducted directly in the hospital, and all grades of staff were interviewed, in particular 
a nurse and a head nurse, a physician and a head physician, the risk manager, the quality 
manager and the chief medical officer. In case of not clear answers the interviewed was 
contacted by email and phone calls to clarify. The direct observations in hospital wards 
were made in different days during the two months, focusing especially on activity 
	   6	  
performed by operative staff. Finally, the documentation concerned all the documents 
somehow related to risk management, management by objectives, strategic plans and 
operative procedures, such as the Hospital Strategic Plan (HSP), the Health Services 
Plan of Action (PoA), the Sentinel Events Reports (SER), Route Cause Analysis 
Reports (RCA), Nurse Reports, and so on. It has to be noticed, that some interviews 
(risk manager, quality manager, chief medical officer) and documents (HSP, PoA, SER, 
RCA) were collected at the hospital level, while interviews to more operative staff 
(nurses and physicians) and documents related to wards (Nurse Reports) were collected 
at the operational unit level, specifically at the Pulmonology Ward, which consists of 5 
physicians and 11 nurses.  
 
Findings 
Traditional CRM (practices for contrasting adverse event occurrence)  
Today the hospital implements CRM activities focusing on adverse events representing 
a potential risk for the patient safety, complying with the literature’s CRM definition. 
Besides a continuous monitoring of activities, the Clinical Risk Management 
Operational Unit uses both a standard template for reporting the sentinel events and 
various Root Cause Analysis forms, taking advantage of the Joint Commission 
International support.  
 
Healthcare Resilience 
Despite the adoption of resilient practices in healthcare is not formalized or contained in 
any hospital document, it’s possible to observe how some actions performed at 
operative level can be considered as organizational resilience practices. In general 
interviewees agree that resilience is a feature all the healthcare workers should possess: 
 
[…] Yes of course, a complication may occur, even if it is very very uncommon. 
But, in case it occurs, I know how to manage it, or at least I know the way I’ve to 
proceed. […] I repeat, we don’t have protocols or other explicit procedures, but 
I say the experience - and studies too, allow us to manage the adverse events. 
(Physician). 
 
By keeping interviewing operational unit people (physicians and nurses) we found that, 
in fact, a number of tacit resilience practices are adopted. Below we report three 
examples of them. The first one concerns the management of a patient fall, which was a 
tacit practices till few month ago and became explicit recently: 
 
[…] Earlier we had a procedure to assess the patient fall risk, but it wasn’t 
written what to do after the patient fell; recently, it was revised and the CRM 
unit gave us this new protocol that anyway pushes us to assess the patient’s 
condition after the fall. Furthermore if a patient falls, now we have a procedure 
that establish we have to immediately alert the physician, bring the patient to the 
Radio-diagnostic department, she/he has to be visited by a physician, and on the 
basis of the results the physician can decide for other clinical tests. (Head 
Nurse). 
 
The second example concerns surgery rooms management when particular and 
uncommon situations appear: 
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[…] Sometimes in operating rooms, some facility management problems happen 
creating critical safety and hygienical issues. Quite often, we need to close the 
operating room because of hygienical problems and this lasts even days. If this 
kind of things happens, the surgery operations which were already scheduled in 
that room have to be postponed. However, if the physician believes the operation 
cannot be postponed, she/he immediately makes a request to move the patient to 
other regional hospitals. (Risk Manager). 
 
Last example concerns an excessive administration of insulin to a diabetic patient: 
 
[…] in the unlucky case I administer too insulin and I’m afraid the patient could 
become hypoglycaemic, while I ask for a physician to intervene, I check-up 
her/him and I administer immediately glucose, even if this way of action is not 
written in any guideline for nurses… thanks to my experience I know it’s the best 
thing to do while I’m waiting the physician to come. (Nurse). 
 
Extended Clinical Risk Management (Risk Management by Objectives) 
The hospital and its wards exercise their functions aiming at the achievement of 
objectives as defined by the Italian Ministry of Health and by the Regional Department 
of Health; such objectives are explicitly reported into the HSP. The objectives in HSP 
are decomposed into a number of actions according to what is written in the PoA. This 
last document defines the inspiring principles which rule the hospital work and provide 
the guidelines to follow during the objectives definition, implementation and 
monitoring.  
However, it seems that some of the potential risks for the objectives are not covered 
from risk management: 
 
[…] I think we don’t have the maturity to do this (extend CRM to all the 
objectives) yet, do you know what is what you say? The optimum, in the sense 
that I’m aware that assessing an objective I know what are the risks of not 
achieving such objectives, in a real manner. Unfortunately, not, it’s too 
complicated, hypothetically yes, but in practice no. There are too factors 
because of it’s not possible. (Chief Medical Officer). 
 
Also, both the HSP and PoA as managerial instruments, seems not collecting particular 
success by the hospital managers: 
 
[…] Every year we define a budget where the General Manager gives us the 
objectives according to those defined by the Regional Department of Health. 
However, my impression is that there is not a strategic view in defining these 
objectives and most of them looks as short-term/problem solving objectives. For 
example a news appears on a newspaper, about the excessive waiting time for a 
gynaecological examination, so reducing waiting times becomes an objective… 
Contrarily this should be part of a higher level strategic objective definition, 
such as make that service more efficient, while it is not!. (Head Physician). 
 
The interviews made with operators working in a more “operative” level, as nurses and 
physician, showed that operational units people consider the objectives defined from 
WHO right and fit to the context, and think their work is directed to their achievement. 
Also, despite we noted little confidence for the application of risk management to 
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protect the achievement of these objectives, operations unit people are relatively 
positive that CRM should consider even these kind of risks apart from patient safety: 
 
“[…] It would make sense, there are lots of motivations, how can a ward be 
efficient when who has to schedule the beds isn’t enough prepared or does this 
without considering what happens but only on the ground of I don’t know what? 
So what happens? There are no beds, the patients are put in other wards, also 
far, so what efficiency and safety can be provided?” (Head Physician). 
 
We also observed that most of the interviewed were very sensitive to the achievement of 
the WHO objective effectiveness, which is strongly connected with the satisfaction of 
the patients needs (that may be different and/or independent from both the patient safety 
and the improvement of her/his health). One of the strongest reasons for which the 
clinical risk should be extended to the other objectives is grounded on the causality that 
links the quality dimensions to the safety, even if the WHO puts them at same level. 
The operators agree that efficiency and effectiveness of services represents fundamental 
conditions in order to assure patient care and safety. 
 
[…] Hypothetically I agree to extend the application of risk management to 
other organizational objectives, because actually the patient safety is strictly 
connected to them (the objective defined from WHO). In fact, when we talk 
about clinical risk procedures, we actually talk about quality management, if 
there is no quality there is no safety. (Chief Medical Officer). 
 
Discussions 
Now we answer the research questions that led the case research development, 
providing suggestions to deal with the problems appeared. 
 
RQ1: Do healthcare organizations implement Healthcare Resilience practices, i.e. 
risk management practices that consider the “magnitude” dimension of risk? 
 
Inside the hospital there are practices directly attributable to one of the resilient 
strategies seen before (figure 2). We saw three examples of resilient practices applied 
inside the hospital: each one can be attributed to one of the four resilient strategies seen 
in the conceptual framework section.  
The first practice deals with the patient fall management and can be associated to the 
resilient strategy reliability, given that it aims at preserving the vital functions of the 
subject that suffers the fall and allowing the patient to take as less damage as possible.  
The second practice is related to the operating room management when an adverse 
event happens and it becomes impossible to follow the operations schedule. Again, such 
practice can be associated to the resilient strategy reliability. Indeed, postponing the 
operations of non-severe patients that, in a normal routine, would have had the priority 
surely does not represent a resilient practice. However finding alternative hospitals for 
the urgent surgery patients may represent a possible dabbing to a complete collapse of 
performance. 
The third practice, the glucose administration for a patient that took too much insulin, 
can be considered a the resistance practice. In fact, the nurse, in the lucky case she/he 
detects the mistake, can immediately recover the situation without affecting the system 
performance (in this case the patient safety).  
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While we found a certain degree of implementation of resilience practice (mostly 
tacit), we also observed that today there are no studies in literature investigating this 
kind of practices in healthcare. Our study represents a first step towards filling this gap, 
but further research along this direction should aim at formalizing the practices, creating 
guidelines and protocols so that the hospital staff could follow them. In fact, given the 
promising results of our case research, many other resilience practices can be found by 
investigating other healthcare providers. 
 
RQ2 Do healthcare organizations adopt Extended CRM practices, i.e. practices to 
contrast those risks that threat the achievement of their organizational 
objectives other than the patient safety? 
 
Although we observed that the hospital implements CRM and few resilience practices, 
they don’t concern hospital objectives, except the patient safety. However, most of the 
interviewed agreed there are many reasons which justify their potential inclusion in 
CRM. While HSP is the document where the hospital objectives are supposed to be well 
identified, we took a look at it and we found that most of the objectives are related to 
the short-term and are more or less problem solving actions. However, we analysed the 
actions reported into the document, so that it was simple to link them to the objectives 
defined from WHO. This link is justified by the presence of points in common among 
the inspiring principles of the hospital (that we remind provide the guidelines to follow 
during the objectives and actions definition) and the WHO objectives, namely 
efficiency, effective and equality. In 13 chapters out of 15 present in the HSP it was 
possible linking every action to one of the WHO objectives (table 1). The great majority 
of the actions relate to the objective effective which is the most correlated to the medical 
practices itself, while the other regard features which could be perceived as “minor”. 
 
Table 1 – HSP actions and WHO objectives 
OBJECTIVES N° % 
EFFECTIVE 78 71% 
EFFICIENT 10 9% 
ACCESSIBLE 13 12% 
ACCETABLE/PATIENT CENTRED  3 3% 
EQUITABLE 0 0% 
SAFE 6 5% 
TOTAL 110   
 
The actions defined in HSP reflect all the WHO objectives (apart from equitable), 
showing that extending CRM to all the actions defined in HSP could have implications 
in terms of achievement of the hospital quality objectives. 
 
Conclusion 
This work aims at extending the concept of CRM along two perspectives: 1) we tried to 
extend the concept of risk in accordance with the most recent regulations (ISO 31000 
standard for risk management); 2) we tried to inherit the concept organizational 
resilience within the healthcare risk management. 
Even if we are aware of the limitations related to the chosen methodology (case 
research) about the generalization of the results, we were able to answer the two 
research questions and conclude that the extended CRM and the healthcare resilience 
are already present inside healthcare systems, even if in seminal form: we found 
evidence that the analysed Italian hospital owns structured objectives and also partially 
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coherent to those defined from WHO. This make potentially possible to extend the 
CRM to different objective other than preserving the patient safety. Also, we observed 
that physicians and nurses already undertake some actions in response to the occurrence 
of adverse events and these actions can be considered “tacit” organizational resilience 
practices. This means that there healthcare systems already implement strategies aimed 
at reducing the magnitude of the risk, i.e. the bad consequences of negative events. 
This work wants to contribute to the field of studies in CRM by introducing new 
concepts and ideas for the evolution of traditional CRM practices that encompasses the 
Extended CRM and the Healthcare Resilience.  
 
References 
Bonfant, G., Belfanti, P., Paternoster, G. , Gabrielli, D. , Gaiter, A.M., Manes, M. , Molino, A. , Pellu, V., 
Ponzetti, C., Farina, M. and Nebiolo, P.E (2010), “Clinical risk analysis with failure mode and effect 
analysis (FMEA) model in a dialysis unit”, Journal of Nephrology, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 111-118. 
Buckle, P., Mars, G., and Smile, S. (2000), “New Approaches to Assessing Vulnerability and Resilience.” 
Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 8-15. 
Crema, M., e Verbano, C. (2013a), “Future Developments in Healthcare Performance Management.”, 
Journal of Multidisciplinary Healthcare, Vol. 6, pp. 415-421. 
Crema, M., Verbano, C. (2013b), “Guidelines for overcoming hospital managerial challenges: a 
systematic literature review”, Therapeutics and Clinical Risk Management, Vol. 9, pp. 427-441. 
DeRosier, J., Stalhandske, E., Bagian, J.P. and Nudell, T. (2002), “Using Health Care Failure Mode and 
Effect Analysis™: The VA National Center for Patient Safety's prospective risk analysis system.”, 
The Joint Commission Journal on Quality Improvement, Vol. 28, No. 5, pp. 248-267. 
Gagliano, A., Grimaldi, S. and Rafaele, C. (2001), “A systemic methodology for risk management in 
healthcare sector.”, Safety Science, Vol. 49, No. 5, pp. 695-708. 
Gibson, C. A., and Tarrant. M. (2010), “A ‘Conceptual Models’ Approach to Organisational Resilience.” 
Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 8-14. 
Kohn, L., Corrigan, J., Donaldson, M. (1999), To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, 
National Academy Press, Washington. 
Sherman, R. R., and Webb, R. B. (1988), Qualitative Research in Education, Taylor & Francis, London. 
Trucco, P., and Cavallin, M. (2006), “A quantitative approach to clinical risk assessment: The CREA 
method”, Safety Science, Vol. 44, No. 6, pp. 491-513. 
Voss, C., Tsikriktsis, N. and Frohlich, M. (2002), “Case research in operations management”, 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 195–219. 
Walker, B. H., Gunderson, L. H., Kinzig, A. P., Folke, C., Carpenter, S. R. and Schultz L. (2006), “A 
handful of heuristics and some propositions for understanding resilience in social-ecological 
systems.» Ecology and Society, Vol. 11, No. 1. 
Walshe, K., Dineen, M. (1998), Clinical Risk Management: Making a Difference, National Health 
Service Confederation, Birmingham. 
Wu, A. W., Lipshutz, A. K. And Pronovost, P.J. (2008), “Effectiveness and Efficiency of Root Cause 
Analysis in Medicine”, The Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 299, No. 6, pp. 685-
687 
Yin, R. K. (2009), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills. 
 
